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We proposed a new quantum bit commitment scheme in which secret key need not to be provided by other
quantum key distribution system. We can get the bit commitment with probability p by adding a waiting
time in a frame during operating the BB84 protocol. Then the measurement outcomes can be encrypted by
one-time pad with the key generated by BB84 protocol. We can also obtain the redundant secret keys to
encrypt other information in this quantum key distribution system. The new scheme can be used to perform
routing operation by which the source can be made sure that the virtual circuits it chosen doesnt influence
on other relay routes in a large-scale trusted relay-based quantum network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Bit commitment is one of the fundamental crypto-
graphic protocols which was first proposed by Blum1.
It is a cryptographic protocol between two mistrustful
parties conventionally called Alice and Bob. Bit com-
mitment usually consists of two phases. In commitment
phase, Alice sends a bit b which she wants to commit to
the Bob. It is concealing if Bob cannot know b before
Alice unveils it. In the unveiling phase, Alice unveils the
bit b to Bob. It is binding if Alice cannot change b once
she has committed to it. Bit commitment can be used as
a block of a wide range of other cryptographic protocols,
such as coin tossing2, zero-knowledge proofs3, oblivious
transfer and secure two-party computation5.
In classical bit commitment protocol, it is accom-
plished by using computational complexity assumptions
to ensure the security. When it comes to the quantum
computer, this security does no longer exist. In 1993,
a protocol was proposed to realize bit commitment in
the framework of quantum mechanics. In 1997, Dominic
Mayers have proved that the unconditionally secure of
the quantum bit commitment is impossible6. And at
the same year, Hoi-Kwong Lo and H. F. Chau have
also shown that non-relativistic quantum bit commit-
ment is insecure because of the Alices cheating by using
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type of attack7,8.
As the increasing consideration of the relativistic quan-
tum information, Adrian Kent proposed a new un-
conditionally secure quantum bit commitment scheme
by transmitting measurement outcomes9,10, based on
Minkowski causality11 and the properties of quantum
information12,13. Then more and more experiments were
proposed to prove the feasibility of this method14,15.
II. P-BIT COMMITMENT SCHEME
We find that Adrian Kents quantum bit commitment
scheme needs not only to measure the signals received,
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but also to use other quantum key distribution systems
to transmit some of its outcomes. According to the quan-
tum bit commitment protocol and the BB84 protocol, we
both need signal photon detectors which is huge waste of
resources. Moreover, we need such a lot of secret keys
generated by the BB84 protocol to encrypt the measure-
ment outcomes with one time pad that we cannot use
a same synchronous clock in both quantum bit commit-
ment protocol and BB84 protocol. We assume that Alice
has 4N measurement outcomes in a frame. The gener-
ation key rate r,the channel error tolerance, Qtol, the
required correctness, ǫcor, the error correction leakage,
leakEC , the protocol is ǫsec secret if the generation key
rate r satisfies16,17:
r ≤ 1− h(Qtol)−
leakEC
4N
−
1
4N
log
2
ǫ2secǫcor
(1)
h(·) denotes the binary Shannon entropy, h(x) =
−x log x− (1− x) log(1− x).
We can simplify the inequality above. First, we assume
that we have perfectly state preparation. So we can get
the length of the raw key is R = 4N ∗ (1 − h(Qtol)).
In error correction, for the purpose of the optimiza-
tion, we assume an error correction leakage of leakEC =
4N ∗ f(Qtol) ∗ h(Qtol) with f(Qtol) ≈ 1.2. In privacy
amplification, we discard the length of the key is:
R ∗ h(
Qtol
1− h(Qtol)
) ≈ 4N ∗ h(Qtol) ∗ (1− h(Qtol)) (2)
To sum up, we can get the final key rate r satisfies:
r = 1− h(Qtol)− 1.2(Qtol)− h(Qtol) ∗ (1− h(Qtol))
= (1− h(Qtol))
2 − 1.2h(Qtol) (3)
Alice chooses random basis to measure the incoming
signals. So when N → ∞, there are nearly 2N mea-
surement outcomes measured in the same basis from 4N
incoming signals which has been measured in a frame.
These nearly 2N measurement outcomes need to be en-
crypted by quantum key distribution with one time pad.
So if we do not depend on the other quantum key distri-
bution systems, the relationship between the generation
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FIG. 1. It is a part of a large-scale quantum relay network.
Different from A. kents model, we denote that P0 and P1 are
both Alices and Bobs agent because all entire relays in the
network are trustful to each other.
rate and the measurement outcomes satisfies:
1
2
∗ 4N ∗ r ≥ 2N (4)
We cannot reach this generation rate r ≥ 1 if we use
the same synchronous clock. Otherwise, we need to be
built two independent systems that costs more waste of
resources.
So we propose a new quantum bit commitment scheme
combining with BB84 protocol and it can be utilized in
the large-scale relay network routing method. Alice com-
mits a bit b by choosing form 4N measurement outcomes
transmitted from Bob in the same basis in a frame. In
our scheme, we only pay attention on the basis which
Alice chooses split in 2N rectilinear basis and 2N diago-
nal basis and abort other conditions. In 2N measurement
outcomes she chooses, we pick the number of x sequences
to be the commitment sequences and encrypt these se-
quences in another way (x ≤ CN2N ). From this way, we
can get the probability p =
xC2N4N
24N+2N
to commit the bit
b. Then Alice transmits the sequences to the other two
trustful relays nearby encrypted with one time pad by us-
ing the secret these new scheme generated. As the other
two relays both receiving the last outcomes from Alice,
they will wait for a moment, and then to verify whether
the outcomes are consistent.
The p-bit commitment scheme combing with BB84
protocol has three phases:
A. Preparation Phase
each of the two relays generate the secret key by using
the bit commitment scheme combining with BB84 proto-
col. The protocol itself begins when Bob sends to Alice
weak coherent pulses random prepared in either horizon-
tal, vertical, diagonal or antidiagonal polarized states.
After receiving the signals, Alice uses a public channel to
notify Bob which signals she has detected.
B. Commitment Phase
Alice chooses random basis to measure the signal which
she has received. We definite that 4N signals which Al-
ice has measured are one frame. When Alice uses 2N
rectilinear polarized basis and 2N diagonal polarized ba-
sis to measure the incoming signals in a frame, we take
this frame as the bit commitment frame. Otherwise, we
use normal BB84 protocol in the frame. We denote the
measurement outcome sequence Sx2N to be the sequence
we choose to commit with length 2N and the number of
such sequence x. The sequence x consists of N bit 0 and
N bit 1. Then we encode the outcome sequence again to
get the new sequence Sx2N0 and S
x
2N1 to decrease the bit
of the measurement outcomes. We can use probability p
to denote the commit probability. To commit value 0 in
one frame, Alice chooses the measurement outcome se-
quence Sx2N0 measured in rectilinear polarization basis in
a frame. To commit value 1 in one frame, she chooses the
measurement outcome sequence Sx2N1 measured in diag-
onal polarization basis in a frame. Then Alice encrypts
the measurement sequence with the secret key generated
by the new protocol and sends to near the two relays P0
and P1.
C. Unveiling Phase
To unveil the commitment, P0 and P1 decrypt the
measurement sequence and wait for a moment to ver-
ify them. (The time they should wait depends on the
average lengths of the two relays and the commitment
time required of the whole system. In practice we set
each channel a different waiting time to make sure that
each one frame ends at the same time in the protocol.)
Then Alice discloses the measurement basis the same as
in the BB84 protocol. At the same time to verify the
commitment, Bob compares the result submitted by P0
and P1. If they are different, Bob rejects the commit-
ment. Otherwise, he estimates a lower bound nrector
ndiag, the number of single photons which sent in the
rectilinear or diagonal basis and detected by Alice in the
same basis. Let nǫ,rect or nǫ,diag be the total number
of errors in the rectilinear or the diagonal basis. Only
when both nrect, ndiag ≥ Ntol and nǫ,rect ≤ EtolNtol or
nǫ,diag ≤ EtolNtol does Bob accept the commitment value
as 0 or 1.
3FIG. 2. The generation rate of the redundant secret key in
a frame depends on the channel error tolerance Qtol and the
probability p we choose to commitment when we set N=100.
The advantage of this p-bit commitment scheme com-
bining with BB84 protocol is that we can use the secret
key generated by the system itself to encrypt its mea-
surement outcomes. Depending on the channel error tol-
erance Qtol , we can get some redundant secret keys to
encrypt other information by adjusting an appropriate p
which satisfies:
p =
C2N4NC
N
2N
24N22N x
CN
2N
=
xC2N4N
24N+2N
(5)
where x ≤ CN2N
In theoretical, when the channel error tolerance is Qtol,
the rate of the redundant secret key in a frame satisfies:
r′ = r − p+
p log p
2N
(6)
By Minkowski causality, P0 represents the probability
that Alice unveil data consistent with a 0 commitment at
P0. It only depends on the operation that Alice carries
out on the line AP 0. In the same way, we can get p1. It
is ǫb binding if Bob has a guarantee that p0+p1 ≤ 1+ ǫb.
Security against a dishonest Bob: The protocol is eas-
ily proved to be secure against Bob, who knows nothing
about the information from Alice. Because Alice selects
the measurement basis which is independent of the de-
tecting signal.
Security against a dishonest Alice: It states that the
bit commitment protocol considered in the paper is ǫb
binding, with ǫb approximating zero when Ntol increases,
given that the tolerated value Etol is not too large. We
can get the ǫb binding in this paper:
ǫb < p2
h(p) ∗ inf
δ∈(Etol,
1
2
)
{[1− exp(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol)
2
1−Ntol
)]
21−[1−h(δ)]Ntol + 2 exp(
(δNtol − ⌊EtolNtol)
2
1−Ntol
)}
[1 +
⌊EtolNtol⌋∑
k=1
(2k − 1)CkNtol] (7)
where p =
xC2N4N
24N+2N
III. APPLICATION
We can use this improved quantum commitment
scheme combining with BB84 protocol to the large-scale
trustful quantum relay network routing method. De-
pending on the every channels secret key buffer, we can
use method of bit commitment to build a better rout-
ing method. When we use packet switching, we should
choose the method of either datagram or virtual circuit.
However, when we choose virtual circuit, we cannot con-
trol the waste of information between the source and
some other routes which have not been chosen. So we
proposed a new quantum relay network routing method
based on the improved quantum commitment scheme
combining with BB84 protocol.
A. Preparation
The packet with the length L is needed to be transmit-
ted from relay A to relay B. (There is no other relays in
the middle of A and B.) We should consider the buffer
bAB in the channel between A and B. If we have n packets
to be transmitted from A to B, we can get the probability
PAB that one of n packets can be served.
PAB =
{
bAB
nL
bAB < nL
1 bAB ≥ nL
(8)
B. Datagram
When using the method of datagram, we can utilize
flooding request to get all possible path that each packet
can pass through. Then each relay route gets the in-
formation how many packets may pass from it. So the
route can provide the serve probability to the next hop
depending on their channel secret key buffer. The source
compares the probability of every possible path to find
the maximum probability way to transmit the packet.
4C. Virtual Circuit
When using the method of virtual circuit, we also uti-
lize flooding request to get all possible path that each
packet can pass through. We balance the served proba-
bility of each channel and the minimum relays each path
has to find a better virtual circuit. After choosing the
virtual circuit path, we use the improved quantum com-
mitment combining with BB84 protocol to commit to all
relays which path we will use, so that these relays can
abort the future mission and provide more secret keys
buffer to serve the packet fluently.
The advantage of this method is that when we make
sure which path we will choose, we can commit to the
entire relay route in this path instead of influence on
others. In virtual circuit, if we find the path we will
transmit, we should tell the entire routes in the circuit the
information transmitted through. And the eavesdropper
can be aware of the circuit easily. However, when we use
quantum bit commitment, we can use BB84 protocol to
accomplish the commitment. It is concealing that the
source does not transmit the actual information to the
next route and the next route just recognize that the
source wants to transmit information. It is binding that
after committing to transform, the source cannot change
circuit. It can save a lot of buffer that the source does
not need to commit with other routes.
IV. CONLUSION
The protocol we proposed in this paper can be eas-
ily used in the quantum key distribution systems. So
we do not need to build an independently quantum bit
commitment system cooperating with other quantum key
distribution systems. So it is low in cost. And from the
rate of the generation of the redundant secret key we can
also get the secret keys to encrypt the information by
choosing an appropriate probability p-bit commitment.
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